Nicholas Teh
Departmental Lecturer
Studies computational social choice, including proportional representation in temporal voting and fair collective decisions.
Nicholas Teh's lab at Oxford works on trustworthy & safe ML, language & society and computational social science. 30 papers since 2023, 1 at top venues, mostly Artificial Intelligence. Applications close .
At a glance
- papers, 2023–2026
- 8/ year
- at T1 venues
- 3%
- PhD students
- —
- MS students
- —
- alumni listed
- —
Papers by yearfrom the lab homepage, 2023–2026
- 14 papers2026 · T1 1 · collecting
- 7 papers2025 · T1 0
- 7 papers2024 · T1 0
- 2 papers2023 · T1 0
T1 venuesOtherVenues: Artificial Intelligence
Research focuspaper titles that use each topic's words
- voting9 papers
- Trustworthy & safe ML4 papers
- collective1 paper
- Language & society0 papers
- Computational social science0 papers
Paper list
From the lab homepage.
202614 papers
- International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)Approximate Proportionality in Online Fair Division
- Economics LettersCharacterizing Maximum Nash Welfare: Envy-Freeness and Proportionality
- International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)Computing Fair and Efficient Indivisible Chore Allocations with Bounded Surplus
- International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations
- AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)Fairness in Repeated Matching: A Maximin Perspective
- Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)Learning Acceptable Lotteries via Queries: Minimizing Aggregated Violation Distances
- Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)Learning Lotteries with Minimal Violations from Membership Queries
- International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)Learning Unanimously Acceptable Lotteries via Queries
- International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)Minimizing Cumulative Envy in Allocating a Sequence of Items
- International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)Online Fair Division with Additional Information
- Artificial Intelligence (T1)Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences
- International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)Strengthening Proportionality in Temporal Voting
20257 papers
- International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)Fraud-Proof Revenue Division on Subscription Platforms
- International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)Not in My Backyard! Temporal Voting Over Public Chores
- AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)Strategic Manipulation in Temporal Voting with Undesirable Candidates
- International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Items
- AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)Understanding EFX Allocations: Counting and Variants
- AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting
- Social Choice and WelfareWeighted Envy-Freeness for Submodular Valuations
20247 papers
- International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)Distributive and Temporal Fairness in Algorithmic Collective Decision-Making
- Operations Research LettersEnvy-Free House Allocation with Minimum Subsidy
- International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints
- European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI)Multiwinner Temporal Voting with Aversion to Change
- European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI)Temporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, and Proportionality
- AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting
- AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)Welfare Maximization in Perpetual Voting
20232 papers
- International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)For One and All: Individual and Group Fairness in the Allocation of Indivisible Goods
- Mathematical Social SciencesWeighted Fair Division with Matroid-Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness
Where alumni went
Alumni are not listed on the lab homepage.
Apply to Oxford2027-28
DPhil in Computer Science
- Round
- 2027-28 entry (January round)
- Opens
- —
- GRE
- See program page
- English
- See program page
- Fee
- See program page
Not yet confirmed for this intake.
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Data
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- The alumni list could not be found on the lab site.
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- The lab homepage
- Members
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- Alumni
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